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Countermeasures list · 5 August 2026

China’s counter-sanctions rules: what actually changes for an importer

Most writing on China’s counter-sanctions regime describes powers rather than use, which makes it hard to tell an alarming rule from an operative one. Six instruments now exist. Four have been used this year. Only two of them reach an ordinary buyer — and one of those landed in August, on the firms that audit supply chains for a living.

Direct answer: China’s counter-sanctions rules do not restrict what you may buy. They restrict how you may investigate a Chinese supply chain, and they penalise cutting a Chinese counterparty off to satisfy a foreign sanction. Both have been live since 31 March 2026. On 5 August 2026 four supply-chain audit and traceability providers joined China’s countermeasures list.

What China has actually built

Six instruments, assembled over six years. They are usually described as a response to US sanctions — true, and unhelpfully abstract. What matters to a buyer is which of them can attach to an ordinary commercial decision.

InstrumentIn forceWhat it reaches
Export Control Law1 Dec 2020Licensing for controlled and dual-use items leaving China
Unreliable Entity List19 Sep 2020Foreign firms that cut off normal transactions with Chinese firms, or discriminate against them
Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021)9 Jan 2021Once a prohibition order issues, nobody in China — including a foreign group’s Chinese subsidiary — may comply with the named foreign measure
Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL)10 Jun 2021Countermeasures against those who implement or assist foreign sanctions on Chinese parties; Article 12 adds a private right to sue them in a Chinese court
Decree 834 — Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security31 Mar 2026Article 13 restricts foreign investigation and information-gathering on Chinese supply chains
Decree 835 — Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction7 Apr 2026The Ministry of Justice may declare a foreign measure improper; a Malicious Entity List covers those who promote it

Both 2026 decrees took effect on the day they were published — no transition period, no implementing guidance. That is why the first months have to be read from enforcement rather than from the text.

What has actually been enforced

DateWhat happened
19 Nov 2024The first reported AFSL Article 12 private claim ends in court mediation, after the Nanjing Maritime Court froze a foreign counterparty’s vessel over an instalment of about USD 11.86m withheld on sanctions grounds. Later added to the Supreme People’s Court case database.
4 Feb 2025PVH Corp. and Illumina added to the Unreliable Entity List. Illumina’s sequencer import ban was lifted on 10 November 2025; the listing stayed.
2 May 2026MOFCOM issues the first blocking order in the five-year life of the Blocking Rules, barring compliance in China with US sanctions on five Chinese refineries.
15 May 2026First use of Decree 835: the Ministry of Justice, with MOFCOM, declares the EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation probe of a Chinese security-technology company improper, and directs that nobody assist it.
5 Aug 2026MOFCOM Order No. 2 of 2026 places six US entities on the AFSL countermeasures list, among them the Responsible Business Alliance, Verité Group, Altana Technologies and Applied DNA Sciences. Anyone in China is barred from transacting or cooperating with them.
20 Aug 2026The same finding under Decree 835 on the EU’s review of JD.com’s bid for Ceconomy.

Five of those six are state-level: oil sanctions, an EU merger review, a subsidies probe. An importer of furniture or fasteners is not the target of any of them.

The 5 August listing is the exception, and it is the one to read. The Responsible Business Alliance runs the Validated Assessment Program and the Responsible Minerals Initiative; Verité’s methodologies underpin much of the world’s forced-labour diligence; Altana maps multi-tier supply chains; Applied DNA Sciences supplies DNA-based traceability. These are not sanctions policy — they are the working tools of Western supply-chain due diligence, and they are now unusable inside China. If a customer contract requires an RBA VAP audit of a Chinese plant, that clause has a problem this quarter.

Three ordinary acts that now carry risk

Strip out the geopolitics and three routine things a buyer does have changed shape.

  • Investigating a supply chain. Article 13 of Decree 834 addresses unlawful investigation and information-gathering on Chinese supply chains by foreign parties. No approval route has been published and no enforcement of that article has been reported. The distinction that matters is between information a supplier discloses about itself under an agreed contract term and information a foreign party goes and collects. The first is ordinary trade. See can I legally audit my Chinese supplier?
  • Dropping a Chinese counterparty. The Unreliable Entity List has always been framed around cutting off normal transactions, and Decree 834 adds countermeasures where transactions with Chinese parties are interrupted. A commercially rational exit is unlikely to attract attention; one recorded in your own files as “terminated to comply with [foreign sanction]” is a different artefact.
  • Writing the contract. AFSL Article 12 lets a Chinese party sue in a Chinese court over the implementation of foreign sanctions, and Chinese courts have taken such claims where the contract pointed elsewhere. Foreign law and offshore arbitration are still worth having — they are no longer a reliable answer to where a dispute will be heard.

Export licences, and the date that decides them

Here precision matters more than volume, because the widely reported extraterritorial rules are not currently operating.

MeasureStatus as at 28 August 2026
Gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials to the USRestricted since December 2024 — in force
Seven medium and heavy rare earths and related magnets — samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttriumMOFCOM licence required since April 2025 — in force, never suspended
The 9 October 2025 expansion — 0.1% Chinese-origin content, and foreign goods made with Chinese rare-earth technologySuspended until 10 November 2026

10 November 2026 is the date to model. China’s suspension lapses that day; the US suspension of the BIS Affiliates Rule — the other half of the same bargain — reimposes on the same day absent further action; and the wider trade truce expires, as set out in the 7.5% overcapacity tariff. Ordinary consumer goods are unaffected. Anything containing magnets, batteries or specialty alloys deserves a note in the file now — and see how long a China export licence takes.

What is proportionate to do

Enforcement so far has been selective, and aimed at states and at large, symbolic targets. That is a reason for proportion rather than complacency: the instruments are drafted broadly enough that six actions do not define the boundary.

  • Move data requests into the purchase contract. A disclosure clause sitting beside tolerances and packaging is a commercial term. The same questions issued as a standalone investigation questionnaire are not obviously the same act.
  • Get written consent before anything happens on site, and keep it. A consented, documented visit is defensible in both directions — and it is the practical answer to an audit programme that has lost its usual provider.
  • Check which audit and traceability providers your contracts commit you to, including through a customer’s standard terms. The 5 August listing bites on performance in China, not on the paper.
  • Record termination decisions in commercial language — price, quality, capacity, concentration — because that is usually what they are. Where the reason genuinely is a sanctions designation, take counsel in both jurisdictions before the notice goes out.
  • Know which legal entity actually manufactures your goods, and leave worker-level personal data out of the file entirely — it engages PIPL and no part of this exercise needs it. See is my supplier a factory or a trading company?

Do not expect your own government to resolve the conflict. The EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument is a state-to-state remedy and has never been formally invoked; the US has no blocking statute at all. Where the two systems collide, the collision lands on the company.

Quick FAQ

Do these rules stop me importing from China?

No. Nothing in the AFSL, the Blocking Rules or Decrees 834 and 835 restricts ordinary buying. They govern three other things: investigating a Chinese supply chain, terminating a Chinese counterparty over a foreign sanction, and complying inside China with a measure Beijing has declared improper.

Is it illegal to audit a Chinese supplier now?

No, but the route matters. Article 13 of Decree 834 addresses unlawful investigation and information-gathering by foreign parties. Contractual disclosure and consented, documented visits sit on a different footing from an uninvited enquiry. The boundary is undefined in published guidance, which is a reason to stay well inside it. This is general information, not legal advice — take Chinese counsel before running a collection programme at scale.

My customer requires an RBA audit of the factory. What now?

Raise it with the customer rather than quietly substituting something. Since 5 August 2026 organisations in China are prohibited from transacting or cooperating with the listed entities, which affects delivery of those programmes inside China. It does not affect the underlying question — whether the plant is what it claims to be — which can still be evidenced directly. See can I still get an RBA audit of a Chinese factory?

Can a Chinese supplier sue me in China for cancelling an order?

For an ordinary commercial cancellation, this framework is not the risk — your contract is. AFSL Article 12 is directed at the implementation of foreign sanctions. The first reported claim ended in mediation in November 2024 after a vessel freeze; further claims filed in 2026 are pending, and none has produced a reported judgment.

Does any of this apply to a small importer?

The instruments apply generally, and Chinese officials have said they will be used prudently. The realistic exposure for a smaller buyer is indirect: an audit clause that cannot be performed, a rare-earth input that needs a licence, or a supplier file assembled in a way that would be awkward to explain. None of that needs a compliance department — only knowing which one applies to you.

What is the single thing worth doing this quarter?

Write two lists: the Chinese-origin inputs that touch the controlled categories, and the audit or traceability providers your contracts oblige you to use in China. They take an afternoon and cover most of the realistic exposure. Everything else here is context for them.

A supplier file that survives both jurisdictions

Registered identity and ownership from the Chinese registry, dated site evidence from a consented visit, certificates confirmed with the bodies that issued them — collected in ways that hold up under Western diligence standards and under Chinese law, and documented so the file can be handed on intact.

Compliance-grade supplier file

Sources

This guide is general information, not legal advice. Requirements vary by city, document and personal circumstances — confirm your specific case before acting. Last checked 28 August 2026.

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